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Abstract
Tradable permits are celebrated as a political instrument since they allow (i) ﬁrms
to equalize marginal abatement costs through trade and (ii) the government to
distribute the burden of the policy in a politically fair and feasible way. These
two concerns, however, conﬂict in a dynamic setting. Anticipating that high-cost
ﬁrms will receive more permits in the future, ﬁrms purchase excessive amounts of
permits to signal high costs. This raises the price above marginal costs and distorts
abatements. In fact, it is better with non-tradable permits if the heterogeneity
between the ﬁrms is small, if the (shadow) price for permits is large, and if the
government redistributes permits frequently.
Key words: Tradable permits, private information, signaling
∗ We beneﬁted from the comments of Dallas Burtraw, Mathias Dewatripont, seminar participants at
Forskermøtet, the University of Oslo and the 2006 European Economic Association Meeting. Financial
support were provided by the EU project ADAM (018476) and the Mistra Foundation’s CLIPORE
Program, Sweden.
† MEDS, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL
60208, USA. E-mail: harstad@northwestern.edu.
‡ CICERO, University of Oslo, N-0318 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: gunnar.eskeland@cicero.uio.no1. Introduction
Pollution markets are becoming the most important instrument for solving our most im-
portant problem. In order to curb global climate change, in January, 2005, the European
Union introduced the Emission Trading System (ETS) for carbon dioxide, the largest con-
tributor to the greenhouse eﬀect. ETS is a two-step procedure where, ﬁrst, permits worth
€38 billions annually were distributed to more than 12 thousand large point sources in
25 countries. Thereafter, the ﬁrms owning the permits are allowed to trade them at the
ETS market. Permit markets have a longer history in the US, starting with the Clean Air
Act in 1974, allowing trade in sulfur dioxide allowances in speciﬁc cases. Since then, the
market for such permits have been enlarged in several steps (Hahn, 1989), allowing exten-
sive trading after the 1990 Amendments. A regional market for nitrogen oxides emissions
was created in 2003 and, in these days, several US states consider setting up an emission
trading system for carbon dioxide, similar to the ETS (The Economist, 2006).
Tradable permits are celebrated as a political instrument. Traditional economic in-
struments, such as emission taxes, are often diﬃcult to implement for political reasons: it
may be judged unfair if ﬁrms that, in the past, had the right to pollute, loose this right
over night. Or, ﬁrms may have political and bargaining power if they, for example, are
able to relocate to a friendlier regulatory environment. For such reasons, policy-makers
often hesitate introducing new taxes, relying instead on ’command-and-control’ policies
where emission quotas are distributed for free. Large polluters typically receive more
quotas for free, since these would otherwise suﬀer the most from tough regulation. A
system of tradable permits has been celebrated as a compromise, combining the eﬃciency
properties of a market with the government’s concern for redistribution.
These two concerns conﬂict in a dynamic setting, however. When the government
frequently intervenes in the market, the ﬁrms trade accordingly. In particular: if ﬁrms
t h a tp r o v et oh a v eh i g hc o s t so fr e d u c i n gp o l l u t i o na r eg i v e nm o r ep e r m i t si nt h ef u t u r e ,
the ﬁrms have an incentive to purchase more permits to signal such a high cost. The
market for permits may then be distorted, and these distortions can be so large that
prohibiting trade is actually better.
We present a simple multi-period model where, in each period, the government distrib-
utes permits and the ﬁrms trade.1 The government is inclined to divide the burden evenly
across the ﬁrms, implying that high-cost ﬁrms receive larger quotas than low-cost ﬁrms.2
T h eg o v e r n m e n tc a n n o tc o m m i tt of u t u r ep o l i c i e s ,a n di td o e sn o to b s e r v et h eﬁrms’ costs
directly. However, the pattern of trade reveals some information, and the government
updates its beliefs accordingly. Anticipating this, ﬁrms purchase more permits than what
1A frequent reallocation of the permits is consistent with the ETS. The permits under the ETS are
issued for a three year period (2005-2007), while the periods will be of ﬁve year length starting 2008. A
frequent reallocation of the permits has been advocated to ensure ﬂexibility: Noll (1982, p. 123) writes
"reissuing permits...gives regulators continuing opportunities to adjust total emissions".
2There is ample evidence of governments distributing more pollution quotas to heavy polluters. In
fact, under the ‘National allocation plans’ of the ETS, some nations give electric utilities more generous
allowances if they use coal than if they use natural gas. Others apply standards based on best available
technology (Zetterberg et al., 2004). For implementing the Clear Air Act, Schmalensee et al. (1998, p.
54) states that "units are given ﬁxed numbers of tradable permits...that depend primarily on historic
emissions and fuel use". Such a procedure is advocated by Noll (1982).
2they would ﬁnd optimal in a static setting, thereby signaling their need for permits. This
raises the permit price above marginal costs and the market ends up being distorted.
As this argument suggests, and the analysis below proves, the market for permits may
be distorted. In fact, the distortions may be so large that a system of non-tradable permits
is better, even though such a command-and-control policy fails to equalize marginal costs
across the ﬁrms. To be speciﬁc: Prohibiting trade is better if the heterogeneity between
the ﬁrms is small, the social loss of pollution is large, and if the government intervenes
frequently in the market.3
Due to the short history of tradable permits in practice, there is not a lot of empirical
material. Thus, many of the studies are based on experiments and simulations. These have
suggested that the gains from trade are huge, with cost-savings that in some cases exceed
90 percent of the abatement costs compared to ’command-and-control’ (Tietenberg, 1992.
See also Carlson et al., 2000; Burtraw et al., 2005). However, compared with observed
abatement, they ﬁnd that only parts of the potential savings are realized. Our theory
contributes to explain this puzzle. Moreover, our model is consistent with the large drop
in price and trading volume in the ETS market late April, 2006 (Section 8 discusses some
anecdotal evidence).
Normatively, our analysis issues a warning to the combination of trade and a frequent
redistribution of free pollution permits. The warning is more important for the Europe’s
ETS, where every period is just a few years. In the American sulfur dioxide market, the
distributed allowances last 30-45 years. Based on our model, the US market ought to be
more eﬃc i e n tt h a tt h eE T S . 4
There is a large literature comparing policy instruments in public and environmental
economics (for overviews, see Baumol and Oates, 1988; Cropper and Oates, 1992). Going
back to Pigou (1920), economists have typically favoured emission taxes since they directly
let the ﬁrms face the social cost of their emissions. Weitzman (1974) shows that whether
q u o t a so rt a x e sa r eb e s td e p e n d so nt h eu n c e r t a i n t ya n dt h es l o p eo ft h ec o s tc u r v e s , 5 but
the choice is in practice typically determined by political considerations. Buchanan and
Tullock (1975) observed that, from a political point of view, it is often more acceptable to
distribute quotas for free, since these are viewed as less conﬁscatory.6 Although restricting
pollution is always costly to a ﬁrm, with free quotas the ﬁrm is not required to pay a
tax in addition. Quotas, however, do not guarantee that the ﬁrms’ marginal costs of
cleaning are equalized. Dales’ (1968) idea of making the permits tradable is viewed as a
great compromise, combining the eﬃciency of markets with the concern for redistribution.
3Thus, eﬃciency, as a function of the frequency of intervention, is U-shaped in our model: Frequent
interventions make the market perform worse, down to the point at which it is better to abandon the
market altogether.
4The US NOx market is more similar to the ETS: permit distribution is delegated to the individual
states and there are more examples of frequent updating.
5Technical standards, on the other hand, are never eﬃcient unless accompanied by output taxes
(Eskeland, 1994).
6This explanation is conﬁrmed by the evidence. Discussing the Clean Air Act, Schmalensee et al.
(1998, p. 56) write: "Allowances were given to utilities rather than sold because there was no way that
a sales-based program could have passed Congress". Evaluating a possible carbon dioxide market in
the US, Burtraw et al. (2005) state: "the primary justiﬁcation for the free allocation of allowances is
compensation for the adverse impacts of the cap-and-trade program on generators".
3Since Dales, many public economists have viewed taxes and tradable permits as equivalent
in terms of eﬃciency (see e.g. Tietenberg, 1992). We accept (and take as given) the
government’s incentive to distribute permits for free, and shows that this concern distorts
the market, possibly making non-tradable permits better. This breaks the equivalence to
an emission tax which, in our model, would implement the ﬁrst-best.7,8
Just a few studies criticize pollution markets, and then typically by pointing to stan-
dard market failures. For example, a ﬁrm with market power would restrain its quota
demands if being a buyer, but restrain its supply if being a seller (Hahn, 1984). The
ﬁrms may also be able to collude and trade in a way which induces the government to
issue a larger total number of permits in the future (Andersson, 1997). Moledina et al.
(2003) observe that the ﬁrms may have incentives to raise the permit price to get more
permits in the future, but they assume that there are few (two) ﬁrms, there is only ag-
gregate uncertainty, and the government does not realize that ﬁrms are strategic. Our
model, however, assumes a large number of ﬁrms and types that are ﬁrm-speciﬁc. The
government is rational, but it cannot commit to future policies.9
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the static version of the
model. This generates benchmark results to which we later can refer, and it makes it easy
to introduce the dynamic model in Section 3. Section 4 derives the market equilibrium of
the model, taking the policies as given, while equilibrium policies are derived in Section
5. Sections 4-5 assume that the permits are tradable, while Section 6 makes a comparison
to non-tradable permits and derives conditions under which this is eﬃcient. While our
model is very simple, Section 7 argues that it is robust to several generalizations. The
ﬁnal section concludes and discusses some anecdotal evidence. The Appendix shows that
distortionary signaling arise even under permit taxes, if some quotas are exempt from the
tax.
2. The Static Version of the Model
The one-period version of the model is particularly simple. There is a large number of
ﬁrms, approximated by a continuum of mass one. Each ﬁrm i decides how much to
pollute, xi,a n di t sg r o s sp r o ﬁti sg i v e nb y
πi = θixi − x
2
i/2.
7Some papers critisizes grandfathering since it distort pollution in advance (Fischer and Fox, 2006),
complementing our focus on signaling.
8Our analysis thus strenghtens the arguments in favour of the ’polluter pays principle’. OECD’s
(1975) interpretation of this principle states that polluters should pay for their own pollution control, but
it does not require that polluters pay for those remaining emissions that are within the allowed bounds
of standards or quotas.
9Other weaknesses with tradable permit markets may be that (i) markets are not eﬃcient unless
permits can be traded (or banked) over time; (ii) quotas distributed on the basis of ﬁrms’ outputs
represent distorting subsidies (Burtraw et al. 2006); (iii) the environmental impact of emission may
vary geographically (Montgomery, 1972). The latter argument is important for sulfur dioxide emission,
requiring certain ’exchange rates’ for permits to be traded eﬃciently across areas. This is not necessary
for CO2 emission, leading Burtraw et al. (2005, p. 282) to conclude that "CO2 would seem a perfect
pollutant for a uniform cap-and-trade program".
4Figure 2.1: Timing of events
Thus, θi −xi is ﬁrm i’s marginal beneﬁt of polluting or, equivalently, its marginal cost of
reducing pollution. This marginal cost decreases in the amount of pollution and increases
in the ﬁrm’s type, θi. With no restrictions on xi, ﬁrm i would set the marginal cost equal
to zero:
xi = θi.
Clearly, a ﬁrm that has high cost of reducing emission (large θi) chooses to pollute more.
From a social point of view, it is valuable to reduce pollution further. Let the marginal
value of reducing pollution be constant and equal to v>0. The socially optimal solution










i = θi − v. (2.1)
We assume that a benevolent government distributes pollution permits for free. Dis-
tributing permits, or quotas, with the number qi = θi − v would be ﬁrst best.10 The





Pr(θi = θ)=ki ∈ (0,1). However, the government has two means of approaching (2.1):
It may try to distribute the quotas according to all available information (the kis), and
the ﬁrms might be allowed to trade the permits after the initial distribution. In fact,
one may disentangle the government’s problem in three parts: (i) determining the total
number of permits, (ii) their distribution across ﬁrms, and (iii) whether they should be
tradable.
Together with the timing in Figure 2.1, the game is now easily solved by backward
induction. Since the government is benevolent, equilibrium policies are also optimal.




Proposition 1. (i) The equilibrium (and optimal) q is given by (2.2) whether the permits
are tradable or not. For any q, however:
(ii) non-tradable permits are distributed according to (2.3);
(iii) for tradable permits, marginal costs are equalized across ﬁrms for any distribution of
10Throughout the paper, we assume that xi ≤ qi binds if there is no trade in permits, such that
ﬁrms always want more quotas in equilibrium. In the static model, this requires that for any i, θi ≥





11For such integrals to exist, we must assume that qi is peacemal continuous in i. In equilibrium, it is
always possible to order the is such that this is indeed the case.
5the qis, and the permit price is given by (2.4).
q = θ − v (2.2)
qi = Eθi − (θ − q) (2.3)
p = θ − q (2.4)













qidi = q ⇒ (2.5)
Eθi − qi − v = λ ⇒ (2.6) Z
i
(Eθi − qi − v)di = θ − q − v = λ. (2.7)
Substituting the second equation of (2.7) into (2.6) gives (2.3).
(iii) From each ﬁrm’s maximization problem,
θi − xi = p ⇒ (2.8) Z
i
(θi − xi)di = θ − q = p.
(i) With trade, q = θ−v gives the ﬁrst-best. Without trade, one might simply summarize
the qis from (2.6) without the constraint (λ =0 ), or substitute the qisf r o m( 2 . 3 )i n t o
(2.5) and maximize over q. Both give (2.2). QED
When the permits are non-tradable, a ﬁrm should be given more quotas if its ex-
pected cost of cleaning is high. In fact, (2.3) requires a uniform emission-cut for all
ﬁrms, compared to what they would be expected to pollute without restrictions. This
is eﬃcient, but it is not ﬁrst-best since the government does not know the ﬁrms’ ac-
tual costs. The expected cost of cleaning for ﬁrm i is diﬀerent from its actual cost,





By allowing for trade, however, high-cost ﬁrms can buy permits from low-cost ﬁrms,
thereby minimizing total costs in equilibrium. Since there is a large number of ﬁrms, each
ﬁrm take the permit price as given. The equilibrium with trade is thus ﬁrst-best, and
trade is always recommendable.
Notice that the initial distribution of the quotas, the qis, have no impact on eﬃciency
if the permits are tradable. Given q,t h eg o v e r n m e n ti si n d i ﬀerent to how the quotas
are distributed across the ﬁrms. Therefore, by adding just a mild preference for one
distribution rather than another, this would be the actual outcome. Such preferences
may exist, indeed. Consider the following possibilities:
a. Fairness: Suppose the government wants to allocate the burden of the policy evenly
across ﬁrms.12 Likely high-cost ﬁrms should then be given a larger qi.
12Hahn and Stavins (1992, p. 466) argue that beyond cost-eﬀectiveness, "other legitimate criteria of
success should be considered, principal among these being the relative distributional equity or fairness
associated with speciﬁc policies".
6b. Participation constraints: Suppose that, in the beginning of the period, ﬁrms can
move to another country without the policy in place, and that the cost of moving is the
same across ﬁrms. Firms with a low ki are then more inclined to move, unless they receive
al a r g e rqi.
c. Bargaining: Suppose the distribution of the quotas are decided in a bargaining game
between the ﬁrms and the government, and let the Nash bargaining solution characterize
the outcome. For example, each ﬁrm might be associated with "its own" political legislator
or district, negotiating on its behalf. Negotiators representing likely high-cost ﬁrms are
then less willing to agree unless they get a larger qi.
d. Market failures: Suppose that the ﬁrms do not trade permits with probability
 >0,   → 0.13 Managers may be time-constrained or the mere transfer of permits could
entail substantial transaction costs. Market power could lead to other market failures.
With such concerns, the distribution (2.3) is strictly preferred even when the permits
can be traded:14
Proposition 2. Suppose either a, b, c or d holds. The initial quotas are distributed
according to (2.3), whatever q is.
Proof : a. With no regulation, i’s proﬁti ss i m p l yθ
2
i/2. With tradable permits, i’s proﬁt
becomes (substitute (2.8) and rewrite):
θixi − x
2
i/2 − p(xi − qi)=( θi − p)
2 /2+pqi. (2.9)
The expected burden of the policy is the same across all is if the expected change in proﬁt





i/2 − (θi − p)










di = θp− p
2/2 − pq = κ. (2.11)
Substituting (2.11) into (2.10) gives (2.3).
b.S u p p o s et h em o v i n gc o s ti sκ. Then, a ﬁrm does not move if the expected proﬁtc h a n g e
Eθip−p2/2−pqi ≤ κ. If this fails to hold for i,i tm u s tb eg i v e nal a r g e rqi to stay. Then,
some other ﬁrm j must receive a smaller qj to keep q constant. If the inequality ends up
binding for all ﬁrms, (2.10) must hold and so must therefore (2.3).
c. Suppose, for a moment, there is a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, n, and these are bargaining














13"[M]any participants opted out of the market", Carlson et al. (2000, p. 1319) state when explaining
why only parts of the potential cost savings are realized. Also Hahn and Stavins (1992, p. 465) write
that "transaction costs in tradable permit markets can be substantial".
14Supporting high-cost ﬁrms by other means than giving them more permits would not change the
results in this paper.
7where e v is each ﬁrm’s beneﬁt of the agreement (e.g. equal to the penalties it otherwise
faces, or equal to vq/n if it is represented by a local legislator) and the term in the
brackets is i’ sr e d u c t i o ni np r o ﬁt (from (2.10)). Letting λ be the Lagrange multiplier on
the constraint
P
qi = qn, the ﬁrst-order conditions are:
p(Eθi − qi)
e v − [Eθip − p2/2 − pqi]
NP = λ ⇒
Eθip − p
2/2 − pqi =
λe v/NP − p2/2
1+λ/NP
= κ,
for some constant κ,i n d e p e n d e n to fi. Again, this gives (2.10) which implies (2.3). Clearly,
this holds also when n →∞ .






















where the last term is found by integrating (2.9). Since the distribution of the qiso n l y
aﬀect the ﬁrst term, the problem is identical to (2.5), with solution (2.3). QED
3. The Dynamic Model
The dynamic model consists of an inﬁnite number of periods, and everyone’s discount
factor is δ ∈ (0,1). The timing within each period is given by Figure 1, and the ﬁrms
cannot store their permits from one period to the next (there is no "banking"). Firm
types are partially persistent: for each ﬁrm i, its type in the next period is the same as
that in the current period with probability s ∈ (0,1). With probability 1 − s, however,
the ﬁrm’s type is drawn again and, then, Pr(θ
+
i = θ)=k. Superscript "+" and "-"
are, respectively, added to all parameters representing the next and the previous period




s +( 1− s)k if θ
−
i = θ





The government cannot commit to future policies, and starts every period by distrib-
uting quotas to the ﬁrms. Even though the distribution of the qisd o e sn o ta ﬀect π −vq,
the government may still be tempted to distribute more quotas to likely high-cost ﬁrms,














∆ ≡ q − q.
q and q are, respectively, the quotas distributed to ﬁrms that proved to be of low cost
and high cost in the previous period. The arguments above suggest q(.) to be a strictly
increasing function, implying ∆ > 0.15 For most of our results, we do not need to further





i > 0 at Eθ
−
i = θ, but the results would hold even if this were relaxed.
8specify ∆, and we therefore abstain from formalizing the mechanism that could lead to
∆ > 0. This way, we keep the model general and consistent with several explanations
and interpretations. For example, if one of the assumptions a, b, c or d hold, then
Proposition 2 suggests that the initial distribution is given by (2.3).16 Together with
(3.1), (2.3) implies that:
q = q − s(θ − θ)









This is in line with Noll (1982, p. 122), suggesting that one "basis for the provisional
allocation is the estimated competitive (cost-minimizing) allocation". Thus, at various
stages below, we can refer to (3.2) to get additional results.
Games with inﬁnite horizons often have a large number of equilibria, and we need
reﬁnements. In particular, we limit attention to Markov strategies, such that strategies
only depend on the history through its eﬀect on types and beliefs. This prevents, for
example, a ﬁrm from threatening to buy a lot of permits (hurting itself and thus the
government) whenever it does not receive a large quota. Furthermore, we restrict atten-
tion to sequential equilibria (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), implying that strategies are best
responses after all histories, and that beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule. Finally, we
rule out equilibria that fail the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). Roughly, this
implies that if a ﬁrm pollutes x, and this never can be optimal for a low-cost ﬁrm, then
the government should conclude that the ﬁrm has high cost and, in the next period, it
should receive the quota q.
For the case of tradable permits, the next section solves the market equilibrium of the
game, and the following section derives equilibrium and optimal policies. Section 6 makes
a comparison to non-tradable permits, and speciﬁes conditions under which this is better.
While our model is very simple, Section 7 argues that the results continue to hold if
the government receives exogenous signals about ﬁrm types; if the ﬁrms have observable
diﬀerences in e.g. size; if the types are endogenous; and if we relax the equilibrium
reﬁnement.
4. The Market Equilibrium
In the static model, each ﬁrm sets its marginal cost of reducing pollution equal to the
permit price, implying
xi = θi − p.
Observing xi and p,t h eg o v e r n m e n tl e a r n sﬁrm i’s type. If there were a next period,
the government would then distribute q to low-cost ﬁrms and q to high-cost ﬁrms. An-
ticipating this, low-cost ﬁrms would be tempted to imitate the high-cost ﬁrms’ strategy,
particularly if ∆ ≡ q − q were large.
16In fact, if one of a-d holds and trade is (believed to be) eﬃcient, then (2.3) is the optimal and
equilibrium distribution for the same reasons as in Proposition 2. If trade is expected to be ineﬃcient,
as it might be in analysis below, then assumption d still implies (2.3) while assumptions a-c would make
the optimal qis somewhat more complex. In any case, ∆ > 0 would still hold.
9This intuition is true also in the dynamic model. Since purchasing permits is more
beneﬁcial for high-cost ﬁrms, polluting signals cost.17 And, since signaling a high cost
may lead to more permits in the future, there is a greater value of polluting in a dynamic
setting. A low-cost ﬁrm might also, naturally, be tempted to imitate high-cost ﬁrms to
receive more permits in the next period. To signal its type credibly, therefore, a high-
cost ﬁrm may have to pollute more than it would otherwise have preferred. We start by
characterizing ﬁrms’ behavior taking p, q and ∆ as given.
Proposition 3. (i) T h e r ei sau n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u m .
(ii) The emission levels are given by (4.1) for low-cost ﬁrms and (4.2) for high-cost ﬁrms.
(iii) The average marginal cost (4.3) is strictly less than the price if (4.4) holds.
x = θ − p (4.1)
























Proof :W eﬁrst prove (ii). If the equilibrium is separating, a low-cost ﬁrm does not want
to imitate high-cost ﬁrms and cannot get less than q in the next period. Thus, taking q
as given:






= θ − p.
Ah i g h - c o s tﬁrm pollutes x. An equilibrium (x,x) fails the Intuitive Criterion if there
exists another alternative x0 which is worse for the low-cost ﬁrm (even if it should receive
aq u o t aq in the next period) but better for the high-cost ﬁrm if the government, after
observing x0, concludes that the ﬁrm has high cost. Thus, in a separating equilibrium, x
must be given by:









+ ≤ θx − x
2/2+p(q − x) (4.5)
=( θ − p)
2 /2+pq.
If the low-cost type’s incentive constraint (4.5) does not bind, the solution is
xn = θ − p,
but if x = xn does not satisfy (4.5), x must must increase until (4.5) binds, requiring:







= θ − p +
p
2δ∆p+.
Clearly, xb > xn if (4.4) holds, and x =m a x {xn,xb}, giving (4.2).
(iii) Simply take the weighted average of (4.1) and (4.2) and rearrange.
17Technically, this is true because the ﬁrms’ objective functions satisfy the single-crossing property in
the space (x,q+).
10(i) From the proof of (ii), there is a unique separating equilibrium. If there were a
pooling or a semi-pooling equilibrium where both some low-cost and some high-cost ﬁrms
polluted x0, q0(.) > 0 implies that their future quota would be some q0 < q.B u ts u c ha n
equilibrium does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion since some x which is never attractive
for a low-cost ﬁrm,
θx − x






is still attractive for the high-cost ﬁrm if the government concludes that such a ﬁrm must
have high cost, thereby giving it q in the next period. It is easy to see that if x>x 0 is
such that (4.6) binds with equality (making the low-cost ﬁrm indiﬀerent), the high-cost
ﬁrm is strictly better oﬀ. Thus, the equilibrium would fail the Intuitive Criterion. QED
If (4.4) does not hold, the diﬀerence between ﬁrm types is so large that low-cost ﬁrms
are not tempted to imitate high-cost ﬁrms, even when the latter simply set x = θ−p and
receive more allowances in the next period. Maximizing static proﬁti st h e ns u ﬃcient to
signal high cost, and marginal costs are equalized across ﬁrms in equilibrium.
If ∆ is large, however, high-cost ﬁrms receive much more allowances than low-cost
ﬁrms in the next period. And if the future price p+ is large, this is very valuable. If, at
the same time, the discount factor δ is large, then the next period is so important that
low-cost ﬁrms are tempted to imitate high-cost ﬁrms in order to get a larger quota in the
future. Polluting θ−p is then not suﬃcient to demonstrate a high type. Instead, high-cost
ﬁrms are forced to pollute more to credibly signal their need for permits. This implies
that their static marginal beneﬁt of polluting is smaller than the price. Equivalently,
the price is larger than the marginal cost of cleaning, since polluting is beneﬁcial for two
reasons. Not only is cleaning costly, it also reveals low cost of cleaning to the government.
Thus, the equilibrium price for permits is higher than the marginal cost of cleaning since
the price also reﬂects the reputational value of signaling to the government.
The equilibrium price for permits can now easily be derived:
Proposition 4. If (4.4) holds, p is given by (4.7); if (4.4) does not hold, p is given by
(2.4).
√




(1 − k)2δ∆/2+θ − q (4.7)
Proof : If (4.4) does not hold, marginal costs equal the price which, as in Proposition 1,
is given by (2.4). If (4.4) holds, equalizing demand and supply implies:
kx+( 1− k)x = q ⇒
k(θ − p)+( 1− k)
³





p = θ +( 1− k)
p
2δ∆p+ − q. (4.8)
Since all periods are identical, p+ = p.S o l v i n gf o r
√
p>0 gives (4.7). QED
The price p increases in ∆ and δ but decreases in k and q.I t i s m o r e t e m p t i n g t o
signal high costs if the quota-diﬀerence ∆ is large and the future close (δ large). Then, the
11reputational gain from polluting is high, and this is reﬂected in a high price. Naturally,
the price is lower if few ﬁrms pollute excessively (k large) and if q, the supply of permits,
is large.
The equilibrium described above is clearly ineﬃcient. For any q, total costs would
be minimized if the ﬁrms equalized marginal costs. Instead, high-cost ﬁrms pollute more
than the optimal amount, and since they have to purchase permits from low-cost ﬁrms,
these pollute too little. Thus, high-cost ﬁrms are buying too many permits compared to
what is optimal.18
Proposition 5. Suppose (3.2) and (4.4) hold. There is too much trade in permits.
Proof :I nt h eﬁrst-best outcome,
θ − x
∗ = θ − x
∗ = θ −









Since x∗ > q,h i g h - c o s tﬁrms should purchase permits. In equilibrium,
x = θ − p +
p
2δ∆p+ = x = q + k
p
2δ∆p+,
which is larger than x∗ under (4.4). Thus, high-cost ﬁrms are purchasing more permits
in equilibrium than what is optimal. Equivalently, low-cost ﬁrms sell more permits than
what is optimal. QED
We close this section by discussing condition (4.4), taking the price into account. The
condition says that costly signaling arises if the (next-period) price is suﬃciently high,
while the equilibrium is ﬁrst-best if the price is suﬃciently low. Since the price itself is
higher in the former case, the condition might hold when there is signaling while, at the
same time, it might fail if the equilibrium is ﬁrst-best. It that case, we have multiple
equilibria.19
Proposition 6. (i) If (4.9) holds, an equilibrium exists in which trade is eﬃcient and
( 4 . 4 )d o e sn o th o l d .
(ii) If (4.10) holds, an equilibrium exists in which trade is ineﬃcient and (4.4) holds.


















(1 − k)2δ∆/2+θ − q
´
(4.10)
Proof : Suppose (4.4) does not hold and set p = θ−q, giving (4.9). Suppose, instead, (4.4)
does hold and substitute (4.7) for the price in (4.4), giving (4.10). The price is higher in
18The result that there will be too much trade holds because the equilibrium is in separating strategies,
which is due to the Intuitive Criterion. Without that, Section 7 argues that the equilibrium can be in
pooling strategies, implying too little trade.
19The possibility of multiple equilibria does not contradict Proposition 3 (i), which characterized ﬁrms’
behavior taking p as given.
12the latter case (simply because demand is higher in the signaling equilibrium), implying
that both conditions may hold simultaneously. QED
Condition (4.10) is necessary and failing (4.9) is a suﬃcient condition for signaling to
occur. When both (4.9) and (4.10) hold, there are multiple equilibria. If the ﬁrms believe
that the price of permits will be low, there is no desire to signal. If the ﬁrms believe
that the price will be high in the future, signalling takes place and the price will be high,
indeed.
5. Policies, Permits and Prices
So far, we have taken the government’s policy as given and only studied ﬁrms’ equilibrium
behavior. Anticipating this, what should the government do? In particular, choosing the
total number of permits q determines the equilibrium price p and, in turn, each ﬁrm’s
amount of pollution.
Proposition 7. The optimal number of permits is q = θ − v, whether they are tradable
or not, and whether (4.4) holds or not.
Proof : If (4.4) does not hold, trade is eﬃcient and q is given by (2.2), as in Proposition
1. If (4.4) holds and the permits are traded, the government’s problem is to maximize











− v(kx+( 1− k)x)
Since p is a function of q,c h o o s i n gq is equivalent to choosing p. And since ∂x/∂p =
∂x/∂p = −1 (taking the next-period q+ and p+ as given), the ﬁrst-order condition is:




− v =0⇒ (2.2).
QED
Thus, the total number of permits should be the same whether trade is eﬃcient or
distorted. Although the total cost of cleaning (for each q) is larger in the latter case, the
marginal cost with respect to q is the same.20
Substituting the optimal q into the price function (4.8), we can state the optimal policy
in terms of the price instead of the quantity (taking as given the next-period policy and
price).
Proposition 8. The optimal price of permits is given by (5.1).









20This is due to the quadratic proﬁt function, and it simpliﬁes the comparison to non-tradable permits
in the next section. In general, the optimal q could be larger or smaller if trade is allowed or if trade is
ineﬃcient: that would depend on the proﬁt function.
13Thus, p>vwhenever (4.4) holds. The intuition is straightforward: If the market
for permits is distorted, the equilibrium price is higher than the average marginal cost of
reducing pollution. The latter should be equal to the marginal value, v, which thus must
be less than the equilibrium price. It is therefore wrong, as is typically presumed, that the
number of quotas should be such that the price reﬂects the social value of cleaning. The
price is excessively high because of the reputational eﬀect, and it should thus be higher
than the value of cleaning.21
The initial distribution of permits is also a political variable. If this is determined
by (3.2), we can easily compare the ﬁrms’ actual pollution levels to the quotas they will
receive in equilibrium.
Proposition 9. If (3.2) holds, q >xwhile q<x.
Proof : With tradable permits under (4.4), note that x − x =
√
2δp+∆ implies
x = q − (1 − k)
p
2δp+∆ (5.2)
x = q + k
p
2δp+∆.
We can thus write from (3.2),
















< x under (4.4).
q = q − s(θ − θ)=x +( 1− k)
p
2δp+∆ − s(θ − θ)








More permits are given to ﬁrms that polluted a lot in the past, but the diﬀerence is
not as large as their actual emission levels. The government realizes that high-cost ﬁrms
p o l l u t e dm o r et h a nw h a tw e r eo p t i m a l ,a n dt h e i rf u t u r eq u o t aw i l lt h u sb el e s st h a tt h e i r
emission levels. Low-cost ﬁrms, on the other hand, polluted less than optimal, so they
will receive more permits compared to their emission levels. In addition, the ﬁrms’ types
might change over time, which pushes the optimal quotas further towards the average.
6. Tradable or Non-Tradable Permits?
The distortions in the market for permits suggest that trade in permits may not be as
desirable as previously thought. But what about the alternative? Since, in the model,
ﬁrms’ costs are private information, it seems consistent to assume that the government
21While the government is benevolent and rational in our model, it may not be expected that (5.1) is
anything like the existing price for permits. In the ETS, for example, the price is very low due to an
excessive number of permits being issued by the governments. This suggests, perhaps, that the ﬁrms were
successful in signaling their need for permits prior to the distribution, without the governments realizing
the signaling that took place.
14does not learn the ﬁrms’ costs if they cannot signal by their emission levels. Thus,
prohibiting trade would imply that qi = q for all ﬁrms. While prohibiting trade would
prevent low-cost ﬁrms from optimally selling their permits to high-cost ﬁrms, it would
also prevent high-cost ﬁrms from polluting too much in order to signal their types. Is it
possible that the costs of signaling outweigh the beneﬁts from trade?
Proposition 10. Whatever is q,
(i) allowing trade is good if and only if (6.1) holds;










>δ s p (6.2)
Proof :S i n c eq is the same under both regimes, we only need to compare ﬁrms’ proﬁt.







di = θq + q
2/2. (6.3)











= θq − q
































Compared to (6.3), trade is good if the last term is positive, requiring (6.1). Substituting
from (3.2) gives (6.2). QED
If (4.4) does not hold, trade is ﬁrst-best and (6.1) always hold. Otherwise, the distor-
tions from signaling in trade must be compared to the cost of uniform emission standards.




,m a k -
ing trade relatively better.22 H o w e v e r ,i ft h ef u t u r ei sc l o s e( δ large), the quota-diﬀerential
∆ large, and the permit-price high, it is very tempting to signal high costs and the result-





is large while δ, ∆ and p are small.
If ∆ is set according to (3.2), prohibiting trade is good if s is large. Intuitively, a large s
means that ﬁrm types are stable and less likely to change. This motivates the government
to increase the quota diﬀerence between the ﬁrms and this, in turn, increases the incentive
22This trade-oﬀ is similar to that in Harstad (2007), studying whether uniformity (and side payments)
are good in a bargaining context with private information. In both that paper and this, uniformity
is better for small heterogeneity, since it reduces the cost of signaling. Otherwise, the models, the
mechanisms and the results are very diﬀerent.
15Figure 6.1: If the social loss of signaling (A) is larger than the gains from trade (B), trade
should be prohibited.
to signal by purchasing permits. Note that the eﬀect of s somehow complements the eﬀect
of δ: if the government frequently redistributes the quotas, then the discount factor δ is
large and, at the same time, ﬁrms’ types are less likely to change (implying that s is
large). For both reasons, then, trade is bad.23
Conditions (6.1)-(6.2) are, for simplicity, written for a ﬁxed price p,a l t h o u g hw eh a v e
solved for p above. From (4.7), p increases in δ and ∆, reinforcing the eﬀects just described.
In addition, p decreases in q which, from Proposition 7, decreases in v.T h u s ,f o r m o r e
important environmental problems, where v is large, the permits should not be traded.
Our description of non-tradable permits might be overly pessimistic. There might be
w a y si nw h i c ht h eg o v e r n m e n tc a nl e a r nﬁrms’ types even if the permits are not traded.
For example, if the ﬁrms did trade in the previous period, the government learned their
types then, and this is useful information when distributing the permits now. Or, to take
another example, the quotas might be enforced by a fee f, to be paid for each unit of
pollution xi exceeding a ﬁrm’s quota qi.A ﬁrm may then be able to signal its type by
polluting more than its allowance (thereby paying f(xi − qi) in penalties). Such a signal
is credible for xi suﬃciently large, because low-cost ﬁrms are less tempted to pay fees for
polluting more. The government can then conclude that ﬁrms paying large fees have high
costs, and they will receive more quotas in the next period. This intuition is conﬁrmed in
the Appendix, analyzing this situation. When f →∞ , xi → q and the quotas are strictly
enforced, but the government are still able to distinguish low and high cost ﬁrms.
23We may write s = b st and δ = b δ
t
if b s is the annual stability-probability, b δ is the annual discount
factor, and t is the number of years for which the government distributes the quotas. Clearly, s and δ
are both decreasing in t.
16For these reasons, it may be more reasonable to assume that even without trade in
permits, the government is able to distinguish low and high cost ﬁrms at the end of
the period. In the next period, quotas are distributed according to q and q,j u s ta s
argued above. Pollution levels are then not completely uniform across ﬁrms, and this
reduces the ineﬃciency of the non-trade system. Hence, the following conditions for when
trade is preferable are stronger than the corresponding conditions in Proposition 10. The
comparative statics are the same, however.
Proposition 11. Suppose the government learns ﬁrms’ types at the end of every period,
even without trade. Whatever q is,
(i) trade is good if and only if (6.4) holds;

















Proof : If the government knows the ﬁrms’ types in the previous period, then ﬁrms that
had low costs then receive low quotas now. The sum of the πisi st h u s :
k(sθ +( 1− s)θ)q +( 1− k)(sθ +( 1− s)θ)q − kq
2/2 − (1 − k)q
2/2
=( 1 − s)θq + ksθq +( 1− k)sθq − kq
2/2 − (1 − k)q
2/2
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Substituting for (3.2) gives (6.5). QED
If s → 0, condition (6.4) becomes identical to (6.1) since, then, it does not matter
whether the government learns. If s → 1, (6.4) becomes the converse of (4.4) since, then,
the non-tradable system approaches the ﬁrst-best and trade can be good only if this is
ﬁrst-best as well.
177. Robustness and Extensions
This section brieﬂy discusses some robustness issues and possible extensions.
(i) To follow up on the last paragraph in the previous section, one could allow for
other ways in which the government might learn the ﬁrms’ types. As long as such a
signal would be imperfect, however, the ﬁrms would still have an incentive to signal their
types. The results above would then continue to hold, qualitatively. For example, suppose




,w h i c hi s
informative with probability z ∈ (0,1). If it is not informative, the government learns
nothing. Thus, with Bayesian updating, Eθ
+
i = zsb θi +( 1− zs)θ. The signal does not
change the situation when permits are tradable: Since the signal is imperfect, it is still
necessary and desirable for high-cost ﬁrms to separate themselves from low-cost ﬁrms.
This will reveal the ﬁrms’ types, and the government can ignore the imperfect signal.
Without trade, however, a more precise signal allows the government to distribute the
quotas better in the next period. This makes non-tradable better compared to tradable












C l e a r l y ,t h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i ci st h es a m ea sb e f o r e .
( i i )T h r o u g h o u tt h ep a p e r ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tﬁrms appear to be identical, except
for their chosen emission levels. However, observable heterogeneity would not aﬀect the
results. Suppose, for example, that k were known to vary across ﬁrms. Then, q and q
may as well vary across ﬁrms, and should be written qi and q
i. Nevertheless, the results
above would be identical if just qi − q
i w e r et h es a m ef o ra l lﬁrms. This would actually
be the case under (2.3), implying that (3.2), and thus all the results, would continue
to hold. If ﬁrms were of diﬀerent sizes, to take another example, we could simply let
the proﬁt function, and all the variables above, be measured per unit of capital (or ﬁrm
size). Maximizing proﬁt is equivalent to maximizing the proﬁt per unit of capital, and
the results above would therefore be unaﬀected.
(iii) We have also simpliﬁed by assuming that there are only two possible types. If there
were more types and these were eventually revealed, the government would be inclined to
distribute diﬀerent quotas to each type. In a separating equilibrium, each ﬁrm would need
to ensure that the neighboring type, which has slightly smaller costs, is not better oﬀ by
imitating the ﬁrm’s strategy. All ﬁrms, except for the lowest-cost ﬁrms, must therefore
credibly signal their types by polluting more than what they would like in a static setting.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf r o mt h ea n a l y s i sa b o v ew o u l ds u r v i v e ,b u tt h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i cw o u l db e
much more complicated.
(iv) Although ﬁrm types are exogenous in our model, endogenizing θi would strengthen
our results. Suppose that ﬁrm i can make some investment that aﬀect its probability of
b e c o m i n gal o w - c o s tﬁrm. A successful investment implies that the ﬁrm is penalized in
the form of a smaller quota, particularly if the outcome is observable. Thus, the ﬁrm has
too low incentives to reduce its cost of cleaning or, equivalently, it has too high incentives
to increase its cleaning costs. The incentives are heavily distorted if the government
intervenes frequently, making a non-tradable system better.
18(v) Our equilibrium concept is crucial. In particular, the Intuitive Criterion implies
that there is a unique equilibrium, which is in separating strategies. This criterion is
sometimes criticized since it implies that high-cost ﬁrms undertake costly signaling even
when almost all ﬁrms have high cost (see e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, p. 110). For
this reason, the separating equilibrium in Spence’s (1973) labor market may be Pareto-
dominated by a pooling equilibrium where no-one undertakes costly education. This
critique, however, does not have bite in the present model. By combining (5.1) and (4.1),
as k → 1, p → v, and almost all ﬁrms pollute optimally. Similarly, by combining (5.1)
and (4.2), as k → 0, x → θ − v,a n da l m o s ta l lﬁrms pollute optimally.
Without imposing the Intuitive Criterion, one could easily have equilibria in pooling
strategies. For example, there is a sequential equilibrium in which all ﬁrms pollute xn =
θ − p (maximizing a high-cost type’s proﬁt), and where the government interprets any
deviation as evidence of low cost. Under (4.4), this would induce all ﬁrms to pollute xn.
Thus, Proposition 5 would be reversed: there would be too little trade in this equilibrium.
The other results would survive, however, qualitatively: demand would still be higher
than what is optimal, this time for the low-cost ﬁrms, since these would not want to
pollute less and reveal their low costs. The price would still be above marginal costs, and
the market would be distorted. If the distortions were large, prohibiting trade would be
better.
8. Conclusions
Tradable pollution permits are celebrated as a political instrument. The system suppos-
edly combines the eﬃcient features of a market with the government’s sense for fairness.
We show, however, that these two goals conﬂict in a dynamic setting. Our model relies
on two assumptions that both ﬁt well with the reality: (i) the government redistributes
permits over time and (ii) it is inclined to distribute the burden equally across the ﬁrms
(thereby giving a larger quota to high-cost ﬁrms). As a consequence, trade in permits is
distorted and the price is above marginal cost in equilibrium. In fact, a system of non-
tradable permits is better if the heterogeneity between ﬁrms is small, if the social cost of
pollution is high, and if the government intervenes frequently. Thus, the analysis suggests
that important environmental problems should not be solved by tradable permits unless
the government can commit not to intervene.
It is immensely important to understand the dynamic eﬀects of pollution markets, since
they are becoming increasingly important for solving global environmental problems. But
due to their short history, it is not much empirical evidence to draw upon. We have already
mentioned that the gains from trade, while large, has not been of the magnitude that
earlier simulations suggested. Our analysis may contribute to explaining this puzzle. Our
model also predicts that the price is above marginal costs, contrasting earlier theories, but
more in line with the evidence.24 Finally, our model predicts that there may be multiple
24Theoretically, Cason (1993) suggests that bidders (in the EPA’s auction) have an incentive to un-
derstate their value of the permit. While supported by experiments (Cason, 1995), his prediction is not
supported by the "real-world" empirical evidence. Joskow et al. (1998, p. 682) ﬁnd that bidders instead
overstate the reservation prices, and state: "The most plausible explanation seems to be that some utili-
ties use the EPA auction process to demonstrate to regulators that they could not sell their allowances
19equilibria for the permit price, which perhaps can explain the sharp drop in price at the
ETS market late April, 2006.25
Theoretically, the analysis provides lessons for the old debate on plan versus markets.
While a perfect market would be ﬁrst-best in our setting (with no redistribution), frequent
intervention distorts the market allocation. The more frequently the government inter-
venes, the worse the market performs. At some point, it is better to abandon the market
altogether and rely completely on command-and-control; prohibiting trade in permits.
This suggests that eﬃciency, as a function of regulatory intervention, may be U-shaped.
Mixing plans and markets might be worse than either.26
Of course, our simple framework has many shortcomings. In particular, (i) we have
taken the political instruments as given (without explaining, for example, why emission
taxes are not available), (ii) we have not modelled why the government is unable to com-
mit to future policies and, despite these shortcomings, (iii) we have assumed that the
government is benevolent. Future research should formalize how voters and the political
institutions determine the politicians’ preferences and their possibilities to commit. De-
riving optimal and equilibrium policies, given these constraints, may bring us closer to
the best possible environmental regulation.
9. Appendix: Combining Quotas and Fees
This section studies the equilibrium if the government imposes some fee f on pollution xi
exceeding a ﬁrm’s emission allowance, qi. Just as before, we denote by q and q the levels
of quota distributed to ﬁrms that were previously of low and high type, respectively. If,
given the quota, current low-cost ﬁrms behaved similar to high-cost ﬁrms, the government
cannot distinguish them and they receive the same quota q0 < q i nt h en e x tp e r i o d .T h e
high-cost ﬁrm will receive q, however, if it is able to separate itself from the low-cost ﬁrm.
Since the proﬁt functions fulﬁl the single-crossing property in the space (x,∆),h i g hc o s t
ﬁrms are indeed able to signal their type, just as in the model above. Thus, low-cost ﬁrms
have no chances of convincing the government that they have high costs, and they solve
the problem:




2/2 − max{0,f(x − qi)}
¢
=m a x{qi,θ− f}.
Ah i g h - c o s tﬁrm’s problem is thus:




2/2 − max{0,f(x − qi)}
¢
s.t.
at prices above those prevailing in the private market".
25Within three weeks, the price dropped from €30 to €10, while the trading volume per day dropped
from 20m to 1m tonn. In our framework, this may corresponds to a change from an equilibrium with
signaling, high prices and a lot of trade, to the other equilibrium with low prices and less trade (Proposition
6). The switch in equilibrium was triggered by news revealing that governments had issued more permits
than their companies needed (Financial Times, 2/11/2006, p. 29).
26Another interpretation of our results is that the ﬁrst and the second welfare theorems may conﬂict
in a dynamic setting. While the ﬁrst welfare theorem states that the market equilibrium is ﬁrst-best,
the second states that any market equilibrium can be achieved by a proper reallocation of initial endow-
ments. This is sometimes interpreted as suggesting that the combination of plan and markets can achieve
remarkable outcomes, both in terms of eﬃciency and equality. This proved to be wrong in our dynamic
model. Anticipating future intervention, the market is distorted accordingly.
20θx − x
















is a low-cost ﬁrms expected value of receiving q +∆ instead of only q next
period. If the constraint does not bind, the solution is
xn = θ − f,
since x = qi surely makes the constraint bind. If the constraint binds, however, x is given
by:











Thus, x =m a x{xn,xb}.I tf o l l o w sd i r e c t l y :
Proposition 12. Pollution levels are ﬁrst-best if and only if (i) f = v, (ii) q,q ≤ θ − v,












Proof :I fq = q, there is no incentive to signal, xn > xb and f = v is necessary for the
ﬁrst-best, clearly. If q < q, f = v is necessary for all low-cost ﬁrms to pollute optimally,
and then x = xn is optimal, requiring xn ≥ xb, giving condition (iii). QED
By setting f = v, ﬁrms face the right incentive to pollute, unless they need to separate
themselves from low cost ﬁrms, which is condition (iii). If ∆ is large, however, it is so
tempting to signal high costs that high-cost ﬁrms need to pollute excessively to signal
their types credibly. The result shows that the ﬁrst-best is possible, even if ∆ > 0,i fj u s t
f is set appropriately and the quotas are not that large.
If, however, the quotas are set according to (2.3), such that (3.2) holds, then the
ﬁrst-best is never achievable, since q,q>θ− v,i m p l y i n gt h a tl o w - c o s tﬁrms pollute too
much. The ﬁxed-quota system can always be approximated, however, by letting f grow
very large. If f grows, (9.1) binds (xn < xb)a n d( 9 . 1 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na s :





+ θq − q2/2
f
.
Clearly, as f →∞ , x → qi ,a n dt h eﬁxed quota system is strictly enforced, although the
equilibrium is in separating strategies.
Proposition 13. If f →∞ ,e a c hﬁrm’s pollution level approaches its quota, tough the
types are still separated in equilibrium.
This implies that in the ﬁxed quota systems, where the quotas are enforced by fees,
the government learns the ﬁrms’ types at the end of each period. This intuition underlies
Proposition 11 above.
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